




How a Reduction of Standard Working Hours Affects Employment Dynamics
Santos Raposo, P.M.; van Ours, J.C.
Publication date:
2009
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Santos Raposo, P. M., & van Ours, J. C. (2009). How a Reduction of Standard Working Hours Affects
Employment Dynamics. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-50). Econometrics.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.






















HOW A REDUCTION OF STANDARD WORKING HOURS 
AFFECTS EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS 
 
 

























How a Reduction of Standard Working Hours
Affects Employment Dynamics
June 9, 2009
Pedro S. Raposo∗† Jan C. van Ours‡
Abstract
December 1, 1996 a new law was implemented in Portugal to gradually reduce the stan-
dard workweek from 44 to 40 hours. We study how this mandatory reduction affected
employment through job creation and job destruction. We find evidence that the working
hours reduction had a positive effect on employment through a fall in job destruction.
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Employment effects of working hours reductions are not easy to establish empirically
and indeed previous studies examine the impact of working hours reduction on the
employment position of individuals but do not address overall employment effects.
The main reason for the lack of evidence on the overall employment effects concerns
the lack of information about the number of workers that find new jobs through the
birth of firms. At the individual level it is rather straightforward to use workers
working above the “new” standard hours before the policy change as the treatment
group and workers working at or below the “new” standard hours before the policy
change as a control group. However, establishing the overall employment effects is
a nontrivial exercise as there is no control group for firms that were created after
the introduction of the policy change. In this paper we attempt to establish the
comprehensive employment effects by performing an analysis at the level of well
defined labor markets.
In Portugal December 1, 1996 a new law was implemented aiming to gradually
reduce the standard workweek from 44 to 40 hours. The main reason for imple-
menting this mandatory reduction of working hours was to speed up convergence of
Portuguese traditionally long hours of work to the European average. In a companion
paper we investigated how the Portuguese working time reduction affected individual
jobs (Raposo and Van Ours (2008)). In the current paper we investigate the overall
employment effects. To establish these effects we perform an analysis on the level
of labor markets defined by industry, region and firm size. This aggregate approach
allows us to study job creation and job destruction as well as worker accessions and
separations and thus the net employment effects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
reduction of the workweek in Portugal. Section 3 discusses the economics of working
hours both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Section 4 presents
our data. In section 5 we report the results of our empirical analysis. Section 6
concludes.
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2 The reduction of the workweek in Portugal
In Portugal, the 1990s were a decade with low unemployment rates; approximately
3-4% points below the EU-15 average. Portugal is considered to have a regulated and
centralized labor market, with minimum wages, strong employment protection, and
collective bargaining widely applied (Cardoso (2006)). The Portuguese government
defines by law the limits to the standard number of hours of work per week.
In December 1996, a new law was introduced with the aim of reducing the stan-
dard workweek from 44 to 40 hours. The law was not passed as a tool to create jobs
and reduce unemployment but was introduced because the newly-elected government
wanted to speed up the convergence of Portuguese traditionally long hours of work
to the European average (Varejão (2005)).
The new law implied first, by 1st December 1996, all workweeks above 42 hours
should be reduced by 2 hours; workweeks below 42 hours but above 40 hours should
meet the new standard of 40 hours per week. Second, by 1st December 1997, all
workweeks still above 40 hours should meet the standard.
In order to compensate firms for the reduction in working hours the new law
introduced some flexibility. The reduction was implemented taking into account
that the standard workweek could be defined on a 4 months average. Furthermore,
the maximum number of daily working hours could be increased by 2 provided that
it did not exceed 10 hours per day and 50 hours per week.
3 Economics of working hours reduction
3.1 Theory
Shorter working hours may be introduced through mandatory laws or may be the
result of bargaining between unions and firms (See also Boeri and Van Ours (2008)).
A reduction of the workweek can be introduced for several reasons. Shorter working
hours may increase the standards of living or it may be according to preferences
of workers. Sometimes work sharing, i.e. reductions in the length of the working
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week leading to more jobs, is motivated as a tool to reduce unemployment. The
idea is that if working time per worker is reduced then employment, counted as
the number of workers will increase. This of course is only true if the reduction
of the working hours does not affect labor demand too much – i.e. if there is a
‘lump of labor’ which can simply be redistributed at no costs. In a competitive labor
market it may be that workers want to organize a reduction in working hours because
this would increase their marginal product of labor (Marimon and Zilibotti (2000)).
The mandatory reduction of working hours would give the workers market power so
they could increase their wage. Of course, individual workers would like to deviate
from the agreement and work longer hours at the higher wage – in the same way
as producers have an incentive to deviate from a cartel agreement. Another reason
for a mandatory reduction of working hours arises when employers have monopsony
power. Manning (2003) argues that in a monopsony not only the wage rate is less
than the value of marginal product but the firm can also induce the worker to work
more than would be optimal for the worker given the monopsony wage. In the same
way as a minimum wage can be welfare improving in case of a monopsony, working
hours reduction can be welfare improving.
Whatever the reason for a working hours reduction, the question arises if there
is an employment effect. From a theoretical point of view it is not obvious whether
working hours reductions will increase or reduce employment. Lets assume that
technology is represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function Y = HγNα where
0 < α < 1 and 0 < γ < 1, which implies that output increases with actual working
hours H and with the number of workers N but they increase at decreasing rates
given the elasticities are smaller than 1. Labor costs per worker are given by
W = b+ wHs + θw(H −Hs) (1)
where Hs is the standard working hours, b represents the fixed costs per worker that
are independent of working hours. These are mainly the costs of hiring, firing as well
as training costs, w is the hourly wage rate, θ (θ > 1) is the overtime premium.1
1 Note that if there are no overtime hours, θ = 1.
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Assuming a competitive product market with price equal to 1, the expression for the
profits of the firm is given by
Π(H,N) = HγNα −WN (2)
The firm choosesH andN such that profits are maximized. The first order conditions
for a maximum are:
∂Π
∂N
= αHγNα−1 − b− wHs − θw(H −Hs) = 0 (3)
∂Π
∂H
= γHγ−1Nα − θwN = 0 (4)





When the standard number of hours is reduced the employment effects depend on
the new optimal number of hours (H∗∗). We distinguish three situations:
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Situation 1 occurs when the optimal number of hours is below the new standard;
situation 2 occurs when the optimal hours are higher than the new standard but
lower than the old standard and situation 3 occurs when the optimal number of
hours is higher than old standard.
Under situation 1 the optimal number of hours is independent of the standard
number of hours.2 Therefore the change in the standard number of hours does not
affect the level of employment.
2 Note that if in equation (5) there are no overtime hours θ = 1, in which case the optimal
number of working hours is given by H∗ = bγw(α−γ) .
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If the new optimal hours choice is in situation 2 the employment effects are unclear
(see also Calmfors and Hoel (1988)). With a high overtime premium and small fixed
labor costs per worker the firm will hire more workers, with low overtime costs and
high fixed costs overtime hours will introduced without expanding employment.3
In situation 3, workers already worked overtime and the hours reduction causes
employment to fall. This is because the hours reduction has made the employ-
ment of a worker more expensive while the price of marginal hours has not changed.
Therefore, firms will reduce the production factor which became more expensive
(employees) and will use more of the input of which price has not changed (hours).
3.2 Empirical findings
Empirical studies find little evidence of working hours reductions leading to the
creation of jobs. For Germany, Hunt (1999) finds no positive employment effects of
the gradual working time reduction that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Andrews
et al. (2005) also find no evidence of positive employment effects of working hours
reduction in Germany. For France, Crépon and Kramarz (2002) study the 1982
reduction of the workweek in France from 40 to 39 hours finding that it didn’t
create jobs but increased unemployment. Estevão and Sá (2008) study the further
reduction of the workweek in France from 39 to 35 hours in 2000-2002. They find
an increase in labor turnover but no effect on aggregate employment. Skuterud
(2007) presents an analysis of the Canadian province of Quebec where the standard
workweek was gradually reduced from 44 to 40 hours concluding that the policy
failed to raise employment. Varejão (2005) investigates the effects of a 1996 working
3 For illustrative purpose consider the following example. A firm employed 10 workers working
the standard workweek of 44 hours at a wage of 10 with fixed costs b. So total wage costs were
4400 + 10b. Now assume that the standard workweek is reduced from 44 to 40 hours. Now the
firm has to choose between attracting 1 new worker in which case the total wage costs become
4400 + 11b. Or, the firm introduces overtime work for which the wage is 15. In that case the total
wage costs become 4600 + 10b. It is straightforward to see that the firm will expand its workforce
if b < 200 while it will introduce overtime hours leaving employment unaffected if b > 200.
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time reduction in Portugal finding that firms’ reaction to the policy is affected by
the presence of minimum wage earners and the use of overtime hours. Chemin and
Wasmer (2008) explore geographic disparities to study the 1998-2000 35-hour reform
in France. They use the historical difference of the region Alsace-Moselle as control
group finding no significant impact of the 35-hour reform on employment growth.
Raposo and Van Ours (2008) analyze the effect of the Portuguese working time
reduction on working hours, overtime hours, hourly wages, monthly earnings and
individual job loss. This study finds that for workers who were affected by the new
law working hours decreased, while hourly wages increased, keeping monthly earnings
approximately constant. Furthermore, the working hours reduction reduced the job
loss of workers directly affected. Finally, overtime hours hardly changed. In terms of
our theoretical framework this implies that situation 2 is the most likely situation:
the reduction in standard hours reduced actual hours. Thus it seems likely that firms
expanded their workforce.
4 Data
We use a longitudinal data set matching firms and workers in the Portuguese econ-
omy, called Quadros de Pessoal (QP – “Lists of Personnel”). Our data cover the
period 1994 until 1998. In order to estimate the impact of the reduction in hours
on the overall level of employment we aggregate the firms to the level of labor mar-
kets defined by industry (7 categories), region (4 categories) and size of the firm (3
categories). Thus we perform our analysis at the level of 84 labor markets.
We define job and worker flows as usual (see Davis and Haltiwanger (1999)). We
denote the level of employment at firm j in period t as ejt; the average number of em-
ployees at the start and the end of the period. We denote the change of employment
at firm j during period t as ∆ejt; the change is calculated as the difference between
the number of workers at the end of the period and the number of workers at the
beginning of the period. The job destruction rate (JD) in period t in the universe of
4 Data 8








where S− represents the subset of firms with ∆ejt < 0. In the same way job creation








where S+ represents the subset of firms with ∆ejt > 0. These measures of job flows
underestimate the true values of gross job destruction and creation. Even if at the
level of an individual firm employment change equals zero there might be some job
creation and job destruction going on. With heterogeneous workers, jobs and firms
making the distinction between job and worker flows is fundamental.
If F is the number of workers that left the firm in a particular period, and H de-
notes the number of workers that entered the firm in that period, worker separations
















By definition, it holds that:
JCt − JDt = WAt −WSt = ∆et (10)
A surviving firm is a firm that is reported in our data in both, 1996 and in the
current year (t). The birth of a new firm is reported if it is the first time this firm is
reported in our data. We consider there exists a firm closure if a firm is reported as
having gone out of business at time t if that year is the first year it fails to report.
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Table 1 shows that total job creation in the period October 1994-95 was 17% while
in the year thereafter it was 15%. Job creation increased to 18% in the period October
1996-97 and October 1997-98. On the other hand total job destruction in the period
October 1994-95 and October 1995-96 was around 14-15% while it decreased to 13%
in the period October 1996-97. In the year thereafter job destruction increased again
to 15%. Thus, immediately after the policy was implemented in December 1996 job
creation increased and job destruction decreased causing net employment to increase
5%. In the year thereafter job creation was constant while job destruction increased
somewhat, causing employment to grow 3%. Of course, these developments in job
flows and worker flows may have been affected by the working hours reduction, but
they may also be influenced by changes in the Portuguese economy. In an economy
known to be characterized by very high levels of firm creation and firm closures
(Mata and Portugal (1994)) it is not strange to see that after 1996, job creation
increased mainly through new firms. The main reason behind the decrease of the job
destruction is not so clear, firm closure or firm contraction. The last two columns
in Table 1 show that worker accessions fluctuate more than worker separations. It
is also clear that worker turnover rates are high. Every year about one third of all
Portuguese workers leave their job and find a new job.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Set-up of the analysis
By using market level data we can take the creation of new firms in a particular
market into account because they are part of employment creation in that market.
The way these labor markets are affected by the working hours reduction depends
on how many workers are affected within these labor markets. As a definition of
policy intensity we use a variable n, defined as the share of affected workers inside
each labor market working more than 40 hours at the relevant October dates. The
distribution of n in the period October 1994 to October 1996, shortly before the
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working hours reduction, is presented in Figure 1. Clearly the policy intensity varies
a lot between the different labor markets. Over time there are some changes in the
distribution but by and large the distribution of n in various years looks very much
alike.
To analyze the year 1 effects of the working week reduction in labor market k
represented by industry, region, size we estimate the following equation:
ykt = αt + αk + βnkt + δnkt.d96 + εkt (11)
The dependent variables are job creation rate (JC), job destruction rate (JD), worker
accession rate (WA) and worker separation rate (WS) and change in employment
(∆e) from t to t+ 1, where t runs from October 1994 to October 1996. Furthermore,
the αt represents calendar time fixed effects, the αk represent time-invariant labor
market fixed effects, d96 represents a dummy variable for October 1996, and n rep-
resents the share of individuals that worked more than 40 hours in October of year
t. The main parameter of interest is δ1 the year 1 treatment effect, related to the
interaction term. Finally, ε represents an error term.
5.2 Exploratory analysis
To give an idea about the relationship between the share of workers working more
than 40 hours per week and employment growth, job creation and job destruction
Figure 2 presents an exploratory analysis. The horizontal axis shows the share of
workers working more than 40 hours per week in October 1996, shortly before the
mandatory reduction in the standard working week was implemented. The vertical
axis shows changes in the period October 1996 to October 1997 in employment
growth (panel a), job creation (panel b) and job destruction (panel c).
As shown in panel a of Figure 2 the higher share of 40+ hours workers, the
higher the change in employment growth. The slope of the straight lines in Figure 2
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represent an estimate for δ.4 Indeed, the slope is positive in panel a indicating that
the larger the share of workers involved in the reduction of the standard workweek
the higher employment growth.
Panel b shows that there is no such relationship with job creation, while from
panel c it is clear that job destruction is affected by the reduction of the standard
workweek: the larger the share of workers involved in the reduction of the standard
workweek the lower the change in job destruction.
5.3 Parameter estimates
The parameter estimates for δ from equation 11 estimated over the period 1994-97
are presented in the first column of Table 2. As shown the change in employment
is significantly affected. The higher n, the higher employment growth. Conditional
on the other characteristics of the labor market, an average labor market with an
n of 0.5 experiences an employment growth of almost 5%. As shown, job creation
and worker accessions are not affected by the reduction of the standard workweek.
But, job destruction and workers separations are negatively affected. Apparently,
labor markets confronted with a reduction of the standard workweek reduce job
destruction and thus increase employment. This would be in line with predictions
from the theoretical model. Limiting the estimation period to 1995-97 hardly affects
the parameter estimates (column 2).
Replacing ykt for t = 1996 in equation 11 by the averages for the period 1996-98
we also estimated the year 2 effects of the working hours reduction. The parameter
4 Note that if we take first differences of equation 11 over the period 1995-96 we find:
∆yk,95−96 = α96 − α95 + β(nk,96 − nk,95) + δnk,96 + εk,96 − εk,95
such that if n didn’t change too much between 1995 and 1996 we find:
∆yk,95−96 ≈ α∗ + δnk,96 + ε∗
In a linear regression we find for δ (absolute t-statistics based on robust standard errors): panel a:
0.090 (1.8), panel b: 0.017 (0.6), panel c -0.074 (2.2).
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estimates are presented in the third and fourth column of Table 2. The results are
very much the same as before.
The market level analysis allows us to make a distinction between worker acces-
sions to new firms and worker accessions to firms that survive. Similarly, we can
make a distinction between worker separations from firm closures and worker sepa-
rations from surviving firms. Table 3 also shows how the working hours reductions
affects the flow of workers to and from these different types of firms. The working
hours reduction mainly affects worker flows to new firms and from firm closures.
Conditional on the other characteristics of the labor market, firms being born and
dying on an average labor market with an n of 0.5 experience an employment growth
of almost 5% after 1 year where half of this effect comes from worker separations
and half comes from worker accessions. After 2 years the effect on net employment
is positive but smaller (3.5%) and it comes mainly from the reduction of worker
separations. The effects to and from surviving firms are much smaller after 1 year
but after 2 years the effects are very similar.
6 Conclusions
Previous empirical studies suggest that reductions of standard working hours do not
have positive employment effects. However, previous studies only measure partial
employment effect while on our study we consider overall employment effects. We
study the working hours reduction that was introduced in Portugal in 1996. Our
study confirms the theoretical predictions and we find positive significant employ-
ment effects. We find evidence that the working hours reduction had a positive effect
on employment through a fall in job destruction. Although the outcome is not sur-
prising from a theoretical point of view it is true that previous studies never found
positive employment effects. We can only speculate about the reason why reducing
standard working hours increased employment. It could be that the increased flexi-
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Appendix: Details on the data
The Quadros de Pessoal data are collected annually by the Ministry of Employment
through an inquiry that every establishment with wage-earners is legally obliged
to fill in. Reported data cover all the personnel working for the establishment in
a reference week in October. Every year QP gather information for more than
two hundred thousand firms and two million workers (see Cardoso (2006) for more
details). We aggregate the firm level information to the level of labor markets defined
by industry (7 categories), region (4 categories) and size of the firm (3 categories).
Thus we perform our analysis at the level of 84 labor markets.5 The table below
shows the (unweighted) means of the variables we use (yearly averages (%)).
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1996-98
∆e 3.9 3.7 6.6 5.2
JC 18.7 18.6 20.4 19.4
JD 14.8 14.9 13.8 14.2
WA 37.1 36.6 38.6 37.5
WS 33.1 32.9 32.2 32.5
5 For some of these labor markets we didn’t use information about all years. We removed some
outliers, where the change in job creation rate and employment growth was strongly negative.
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Tab. 1: Job flows and worker flows; 1994-1998
Firm Firm Firm Firm Total Job Total Job Net Worker Worker
New Expansion Contraction Closure Creation Destruction Employment Accession Separation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1+2) (3+4) (5) (6)
1994-95 8 9 6 7 17 14 3 33 30
1995-96 7 8 7 8 15 15 0 31 31
1996-97 10 9 6 7 18 13 5 35 30
1997-98 9 9 6 9 18 15 3 34 31
Note: Change in employment between two subsequent dates as percentage of the average
employment at these two dates; October data.
Tab. 2: Baseline estimates
1 year effect 2 years effect
1994-97 1995-97 1994-98 1995-98
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆e 0.097 (2.2)** 0.125 (2.2)** 0.091 (1.9)* 0.110 (1.8)*
JC 0.013 (0.5) 0.013 (0.4) 0.006 (0.2) -0.002 (0.1)
JD -0.084 (3.2)** -0.113 (3.2)** -0.085 (2.5)** -0.113 (2.5)**
WA 0.020 (0.7) 0.030 (0.9) -0.004 (0.1) -0.007 (0.2)
WS -0.082 (2.5)** -0.096 (2.1)** -0.097 (2.3)** -0.117 (2.1)**
Observations 249 165 250 165
Labor markets 84 84 84 84
Note: All estimates also have the share of 40+ hours workers (n) as explanatory variable
in addition to labor market fixed effects (84) and calendar period fixed effects (3); abso-
lute t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses; a **/* indicates that the
coefficient is different from zero at a 5%/10% level of significance.
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Tab. 3: Sensitivity analysis; distinguishing between surviving firms and firms being
born/dying
1 year effect 2 years effect
1994-97 1995-97 1994-98 1995-98
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firms being born and dying
∆e 0.089 (2.8)** 0.112 (2.6)** 0.061 (1.9)* 0.083 (2.1)**
WA 0.045 (2.1)** 0.048 (1.8)* 0.019 (1.0) 0.019 (0.8)
WS -0.044 (2.5)** -0.064 (2.6)** -0.042 (1.9)* -0.064 (2.2)**
Surviving firms
∆e 0.008(0.3) 0.013 (0.4) 0.030 (1.1) 0.027 (0.8)
WA -0.025 (1.0) -0.019 (0.7) -0.024 (0.8) -0.026 (0.8)
WS -0.038 (1.6) -0.032 (1.0) -0.055 (2.3)** -0.052 (1.7)*
Observations 249 165 250 165
Labor markets 84 84 84 84
Note: All estimates also have the share of 40+ hours workers (n) as explanatory variable
in addition to labor market fixed effects (84) and calendar period fixed effects (3); abso-
lute t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses; a **/* indicates that the
coefficient is different from zero at a 5%/10% level of significance.
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Fig. 1: Market level distribution of the share of workers working more than
40 hours per week; October 1994-96
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Fig. 2: Changes in employment growth, job creation and job destruction;
1996-1997
a. Employment growth
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